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AbstrAct
This study seeks to explain the management entrenchment by investment of free 
cash flow (FCF) in research and development (R&D), debt, market structure 
(internal or external), the multinational nature of firms and the characteristics of 
the board of directors using a sample of 128 groups of French companies listed on 
the SBF250 between 2003 and 2008. The results show that investment in R&D 
helps the managers to enhance their authority with respect to the shareholders. The 
multinational nature of the firm exerts a significant effect on the entrenchment 
strategy. Manager replaces the internal capital market to the outside market to 
avoid scrutiny by creditors. We also find an insignificant effect exerted by the debt 
on the management entrenchment. Finally, we find the absence of a significant 
relationship between management entrenchment, as measured by discretionary ac-
cruals and seniority of the officers, and the characteristics of the board of directors.
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Introduction
The management entrenchment is a deliberated behavior realized by the manager 
considered as more informed actor which consists of serving own interests at the 
expense of the shareholders as less informed actors. It takes different forms. The 
first consists of influencing the accounting results by increasing or decreasing them 
according to individual needs. The second consists of increasing the specific invest-
ment to let the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers more 
complex, which helps these later to maintain their stations long term. 
The agency theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990) examines this subject on the level of the agency conflicts characterizing the 
relationships between managers, shareholders and creditors. It insists on several con-
trol systems limiting the differences of opinions and interests. The confrontation of 
this theory to the entrenchment one explains why some control systems are ineffec-
tive when managers serve their own interests at the expense of shareholders. This is 
to say that the integration of the entrenchment theory hypotheses contributes to 
determine the limits of the mechanisms of control exerted on the managers to incite 
them to act in the interest of their principal (Alexandre and Paquerot, 2000). 
The analysis of the control systems exerted to influence the management behavior 
is essential to the comprehension of the organization’s function and its performance 
(Alexandre and Paquerot, 2000). However, in spite of the importance of studies re-
alized within the framework of the independent firms, this topic remains, according 
to our knowledge, little explored within the framework of the companies of group 
such as the particular case of the multinational companies having a strong interna-
tionalized activities. 
The aim of this study is to identify and analyze the factors, being able to reinforce 
or to attenuate the discretionary behavior of the managers in order to discover the 
differences or the similarities of the behaviors of the managers in multinational and 
domestic companies as regards the entrenchment target. 
To reach this objective, we try to confront various theories to argue the entrench-
ment strategies. The diversity of ideas developed in theoretical and empirical studies 
shows the absence of agreement on the matter. It leads to question on the strategy 
and trajectories of entrenchment and on the effectiveness of the control systems 
imposed on the managers. Accordingly, the central question of our research:
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Up to what point can the entrenchment systems influence the effectiveness of the control 
imposed on the managers?
To bring answers to this question, we try to investigate the managers’ discretion-
ary behavior of 128 multinational and domestic French firms over the 2003-2009 
period to identify the influences which they had to undergo by the mechanisms of 
control.
This paper is organized as follows: in the first section we present the management 
entrenchment strategy and the factors influencing positively or negatively the op-
portunist behavior. We present in the second section the methodology and the esti-
mated model. Results are presented and discussed in the third section. Finally, the 
fourth section is devoted to the conclusion.
Entrenchment strategy and influences of the control systems imposed  
on the managers
Trajectories of the management entrenchment
The concept of entrenchment was developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1989). It is a 
strategy which focuses on the directors to increase their own utilities in their organiza-
tion by increasing their private expenditure and/or the cost of their replacement.
Profiting from a situation of entrenchment, the manager may, likely, de-
cide according to his situation to benefit from his capacity in pecuniary or 
different other form. He can also increase his capacity to be maintained in the 
station longest possible or to transmit his capacity to a successor whom will 
have chosen (Paquerot and Chapuis, 2003). For these reasons, he develops vari-
ous strategies. S/He uses the resources of his organization to invest in specific 
activities which increase the firm’s risk and generate a significant informational 
asymmetry. Accordingly, s/he increases his capacity and different advantages s/
he perceives such as the good remuneration and the security of his job (Alex-
andre and Paquerot 2000). 
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Compared to the whole of the firm’s partners, the managers have a better access 
to the specific information. This latter constitutes an essential resource for the or-
ganization. It represents for the controllers a source of power (Pfeffer 1881, 1882, 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, the strategic state of the managers enables 
them to control the access to the information and to restrict its availability for the 
other actors in the organization. Their investment and finance policies depend on 
the nature of their objectives. They act in increasing the informational asymmetry 
towards the controllers to increase their discretionary behavior. To spur their op-
portunism by preparing a suitable land, they maintain various transactions with the 
subsidiaries such as specific investments (transactions in physical flow) or use their 
internal capital market (ICM) (transactions in financial flows) by transferring inter-
nal resources between the parent companies and their subsidiaries or between the 
subsidies themselves to finance specific and (geographically) diversified investments. 
These strategies help them to limit the access of the other actors in the firm to the 
information. This indicates that the innovation and the decentralization constitute 
a means to avoid the control exerted by the shareholders and other stakeholders.
Stiglitz and Edlin (1992) explain how the managers can benefit from the information-
al asymmetry to restrict the shareholders’ control and to dissuade potential directors to 
postulate for the firm management. The investment policy constitutes, in this way, a 
notable entrenchment tool. According to Alexandre and Paquerot (2000) the increase 
in firm risks through a particular investment policy in the specific sectors but well-
known to the managers can eliminate potential competitors’ teams without necessary 
skills to a good management of the firm.
The aim of the strategies adopted by the managers is to increase their discretionary be-
havior “using the means at their disposal, i.e. their human skills but also the firm’s assets, to 
neutralize the control systems and to increase the dependence of the stakeholders towards the 
resources which they control” (Alexandre and Paquerot, 2000; p. 9).
They can also increase the informational asymmetry towards the stakeholders by in-
vesting in assets they have good know-how. This makes information more complex 
to apprehend for the stakeholders and the potential directors. Thus, it would be 
beneficial for the manager to increase the dependence of the shareholders to them 
in order to increase their discretionary behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). They make specific transactions with the subsidies and 
decentralize the specific investments even this can be against the objective of maxi-
mization of the shareholders wealth.
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The management entrenchment becomes easier once the informational asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers increases. Thus, the latter find advantages in 
investing in assets raising their discretionary. Innovation and decentralization con-
stitute strategic tools helping managers to increase their informational asymmetry 
towards the shareholders. Particularly, the decentralization of the specific invest-
ment makes more difficult the control of the managers’ behavior. Geographical, lin-
guistic and cultural disparities induce – at least - two effects: the increase in the cost 
of information and the decrease of their pertinence and quality. Moreover, the R&D 
includes large part of tacit knowledge (Grant, 1996a and b; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1997). Thus, it would be so difficult to transfer this information, which constrains 
the shareholders to exert their control on the managers. 
These investment policies (innovation and decentralization) decrease the effective-
ness of the control exerted on the managers. The comprehension of their effects on 
the effectiveness of the modes of control and consequently on managerial behavior 
can be given starting from the confrontation of the contributions of the entrench-
ment and the agency theories.
H1a: The increase in R&D facilitates the management entrenchment.
H1b : The decentralization of the specific investments reinforces  
the managerial discretionary behavior.
The managers use the free cash-flows to finance the R&D programs. This financial 
mode allows them to avoid the debt finance which constitutes an effective system 
of control. In this sense, Jensen (1986) supposes that managers can increase their 
wealth at the expense of the shareholders by investing the free cash-flow in specific 
assets and limiting their distribution as dividend. In the same idea, the entrench-
ment theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), argues that the managers invest these 
funds in specific investments to increase their compensation and their private ex-
penditure since they are related to the increase in the firm size. Thus, they take 
advantages using the free cash-flows to avoid the control exerted by the external 
market and to increase discretionary behavior in making decisions, which enables 
them to increase their authority towards the shareholders. Indeed, investment on the 
free cash-flows even in non-profitable projects increases the firm size over its optimal 
limit. This gives the manager more ability to increase the value of assets under their 
control and to constrain the control exerted by the shareholders.
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Taking the predictions of the agency theory as a starting point, several studies sup-
pose, in opposition to the pecking order theory of Myers (1984), which excessive 
use of internal financing is due to the agency conflicts between the managers and 
the creditors. Seeking to limit external control, the managers prefer internal finance 
compared to the debt. This helps them to protect information relating to the strate-
gies of development of their organizations (Gertner, Robert, Scharfstein and Stein, 
1994). It reinforces, also, their discretionary power and limits the control exerted 
by the creditors. 
In the absence of a bank control, the managers can make decisions serving their own 
interests. They benefit from the stability of the cash-flows to increase their investment 
in R&D. The decentralization of these investments offers them additional possibili-
ties to improve their wealth at the expense of the shareholders. It reinforces informa-
tional asymmetry between managers and shareholders by increasing the knowledge 
dispersion which induces several difficulties to evaluate present and future value of 
the firm.
H2: The presence of free-cash-flows helps manager  
to invest in R&D in entrenchment targets
While many existing studies report that diversified firms can rely on internal capital 
markets that enable them to pool and reallocate corporate resources more efficiently 
than external market (Williamson 1975), several recent studies challenge these find-
ings. Anxious to increase informational asymmetries towards the shareholders, the 
managers invest in R&D and diversify them. They benefit from the presence of the 
internal capital market (ICM) to transfer the financial resources from the subsidi-
ary with excess financial resources to those having important investments in R&D. 
Thus, the ICM helps managers to finance the specific investments, which conse-
quently support their entrenchment. It constitutes a fundamental financing instru-
ment for risky investments which are rationed on the external market. Its presence 
reinforces the managers’ opportunism and decreases the shareholders gain. Accord-
ingly, the transfer of resources to the subsidiary with high R&D, through the ICM 
is considered as induced by the objective of maximization of the managers’ wealth at 
the expense of the shareholders (Jian and Wong, 2003; Liu and Lu, 2004; Thomas, 
Herrmann and Inoue, 2004; Chang, 2003;  Friedman, Johnson and Mitton, 2003). 
The managers can, particularly, make special transfer of resources serving their own 
needs  (Jian and Wong, 2003 and Thomas et al., 2004). They manage to divert the 
firm resources to specific projects offering them more independence on the share-
R&D Investment, Governance and Management Entrenchment in French Companies Listed in SBF250
11Volume 1        Number 2        July 2011
holders and other external controllers using internal transfers of capital between 
parent companies and their subsidiaries and/or between the subsidiaries themselves 
(Chang, 2003; Friedman et al., 2003; Liu and Lu, 2004).
This transfer of resources to the specific and geographically diversified investments 
helps managers to paralyze the control systems by increasing the informational 
asymmetry within the organization. This asymmetry contributes largely to affect 
the effectiveness of the control systems and prevents the controllers from applying 
a sanction.
H3: Managers substitute their internal capital market  
to external market in order to avoid the control system.
The agency relationship:  conflict of interest which incites to develop different 
mechanisms of control
The financial theory supposes that various modes of control can be used to force 
the managers to manage the firm in accordance with shareholders’ interests. The 
shareholders’ structure, the composition of the board of directors, the presence of 
institutional investors, the incentive compensation, the debt… constitute direct or 
indirect control systems influencing the managers’ behavior. Thus, the shareholders 
concentration and/or the presence of financial or institutional shareholders are sup-
posed to have a positive influence on the firm performance. In the same way, the 
presence of certain administrators (financial or institutional), the part of capital held 
by the member of the board of directors and the recourse to external administrators 
more independent and more qualified than the internal ones should exert an effec-
tive control on the managers (Alexandre and Paquerot 2000). At the same, the use 
of debt and incentive compensation can dissuade the manager to manage the firm 
so as to improve its performance because they must pay future engagements towards 
their creditors and they have to improve their remuneration since it is indexed on 
the performance.
However, in opposition to the agency theory which proposes various mechanisms 
to control the managers and to incite them to make decision improving the firm 
profitability, the entrenchment theory relativizes the role of these mechanisms. It 
supposes that they will not always be sufficient to limit the opportunistic behaviors 
of the managerial teams (Alexandre and Paquerot, 2000).
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Thus, the potential investors find in the development of the agency theory a whole 
of control systems allowing, on one hand, to discipline the managers and on the 
other hand, to incite them to manage the firm in accordance with their principal 
interests.
In this design, the board of directors constitutes, according to the agency theory, the 
principal internal mechanism of control. The board of directors presents a specific 
influence on the other control systems exerted on the managers and has a significant 
disciplinary role dissuading the managers to act in the shareholders interest. This 
conception was supported theoretically by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). They 
announce that the board of directors contributes to reduce the agency conflicts be-
tween the shareholders and the managers. This prediction is confirmed recently by 
Lefort and Urzua (2008). These authors confirm the fact that the board of directors 
plays a pivotal role in the management control. It constitutes a principal mechanism 
of control which seems to reduce the agency costs between the shareholders and the 
managers.
Particularly three significant dimensions of the board of directors are frequently 
discussed in previous theoretical and empirical studies. The first is related to the size 
of the board (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). A big size increases the effectiveness 
of the control exerted by the board of directors because in such case there is high 
possibility to be composed by more experiments and competent members. However, 
the difficulties in coordinating the individual contributions, the conflicts at the time 
of the decision-making and the difficulties in maintaining good relations between the 
members as well as the high costs of communications between them seem to reduce 
these advantages and the effectiveness of the control exerted by the board on the man-
agers (Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; Jensen, 1993).
H4a : The larger the size of board of directors, the higher the effect  
on the managers’ activities.
Moreover, the entrenchment theory insists particularly on a pivotal dimension: 
the independence of the administrators to the managers (Alexandre and Paquerot, 
2000). According to Weisbach (1988) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) internal 
administrators have more capacity to be opposed to the most contestable decisions 
that make the managers than it is the case of internal administrators. Their presence 
increases the shareholders wealth rather than reinforce the management entrench-
ment (Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner, 1997; Black, Jang, and Him, 2006).
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Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell. (2008) investigated the effectiveness of the con-
trol exerted by the board of directors. Using a panel of 799 companies in 22 coun-
tries, they conclude that the independence of the board of directors ensures an effec-
tive control on the managers. Kor and Misangyi (2008) confirmed the same result 
using a sample of 78 firms over the 1990-1995 period and by Lefort and Urzua 
(2008) using a sample of 160 Chilean Companies. More recently, several studies 
such as Lin, Ma and Su (2009) and Lau, Sinnadurai and Wright (2009) have con-
firmed the same results that independence of the boards of directors improves the 
effectiveness of the controls of the managers. Particularly, Chen, Dyball and Wright. 
(2009) confirmed this relationship using a sample of 101 Australian firms and con-
clude that external administrators have more capacity to control the manager when 
compared to internal ones.
H4b : The presence of external administrators reinforces  
the effectiveness of the board of directors
The distinction between the function of chief executive officer (COE) and the chair-
man of the board of directors constitutes the third dimension is considered as very 
important. 
Few studies support the idea that the duality of functions improves the firm perfor-
mance (Godard and Schatt, 2000). They consider that duality facilitates the man-
agement and avoid divergence in making decisions and strategies. It leads conse-
quently, a higher performance (Godard, 1998). 
Oppositely, several studies consider that duality limits the separation of the func-
tions of decision and control. It plays against the principle of independence of the 
board of directors through the manager influences (Mizruchi, 1983; Patton and 
Baker, 1987; Daily and Dalton, 1993). However, the separation of both the func-
tion of CEO and chairman of the board limits the capacity of the manager to influ-
ence the control exerted by the administrators (Beasley and Salterio, 2001). Thus, 
the separation of the two functions seems to limit the discretionary behavior of the 
manager and to ensure the effectiveness control exerted by the board of directors 
(Jensen, 1993).
H4c: The separation of both the function of CEO and chairman  
of the board of directors improves the effectiveness of the board of directors.
Regarding the influence of institutional investors, schools of thought seem to be 
opposed. The first, represented by the holding of the agency theory, confirms the 
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hypothesis of institutional investors controllers. They contribute effectively to the 
control of the managers (Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988; Barclay and Holderness, 
1991; Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mallette and 
Fowler (1992); Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1992; 
like Bathala, Moon, and Rao, 1994). The importance of capital they hold gives 
them more authority toward the managers (Brickley and al, 1988; Pound, 1992). 
It incites them, in addition, to invest in manager control because they will not have 
the capacity to liquidate their situation easily. This control helps them to avoid the 
losses associated to the managers’ discretionary they can support.
Moreover, the importance and the diversity of investments they carry out give them 
the advantage of easy access to information, which facilitated their control of man-
agers. In this line, Alexandre and Paquerot (2000; p. 15) suppose that “the resources 
they hold help them to exert their control at a weaker cost than the other stakeholders. In 
fact, the nature of their activities and the importance of investments they carry out allow 
them a better access to information, which implies simultaneously a better knowledge on 
the performance of the companies of the sector, abundant information on the environ-
ment, a better knowledge of the management market… Moreover, they have particular 
skills to analyze available information about the firm and its environment. These various 
advantages enable them to exert their control at a weaker cost compared to individual 
shareholders “.
The second current of thought, represented by the holding of the [Les tenants de 
la théorie] entrenchment theory, supports the hypothesis of institutional investors 
serving the managers interests. Pound (1988), Wruck (1989), Shivdasani (1993) 
and Slovin and Sushka (1993) argue that institutional investors have the capacity 
to collaborate with managers at the expense of the ordinary shareholders. Their 
presence limits, consequently, the effectiveness of the other mechanisms of control 
(Neumann and Voetmann, 1998) and encourages the management entrenchment. 
In fact, they can act as speculative shareholders and privilege the short-term return 
on the long-term (Ben M’Barek, 2003; Coffee, 1991; Stapledon, 1996; Bushee, 
2001). Having such qualities, they find more advantages in collaborating with the 
managers rather than in investing in their control. This increases their own wealth 
on the shirt-term level even at the expense of the other shareholders.
H5 : Institutional investors contribute to an effective control on the managers
In addition, the use of the stock-options as incentive compensation is considered by 
the financial theory intended to incite the managers to invest in the more profitable 
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projects (Baber, Janakiraman and Kang, 1996; Kole, 1997; Hutchinson and Gul, 
2004). They are intended to solve the agency conflicts by indexing the managers’ compen-
sation on the firm performance (Caby and Hirigoyen, 2005).
Thus, several studies show that the stock-options play a pivotal role in aligning 
the managers’ interests on those of the shareholders which reduce significantly the 
agency conflicts (Core and Guay, 2001; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Yermack, 1995; 
Mehran, 1995; Palia, 2001). They reduce the divergence of interests between the 
shareholders and the managers and incite these later to make more profitable deci-
sions.
Taking the agency theory as a starting point, these studies consider that incentive 
compensation contributes to align the managers’ interests on those of the share-
holders. It influences positively the performance since it incites the managers to 
make more profitable decisions (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1986; Hall 
and Liebman, 1998). 
Oppositely, several studies support the predictions of the entrenchment theory and 
reject the assumption that incentive compensation reduces the conflicts of inter-
est between managers and shareholders. According to Chen, Steiner and Whyte 
(2006) and Sullivan and Spong (2007), the stock-option can induce more risk for 
the shareholders on the long-term and can cause damages to their wealth. In fact, 
the managers try to increase the value of the stocks they hold in order to improve 
their compensation. This incites them to manipulate the accounting results to en-
hance them or to smooth their volatility in order to influence the way the potential 
investors perceive the future profitability and risk of the firm. This masks the real 
profitability and affects the firm growth since the shareholders make their decisions 
using bad information about accounting results. They can invest in projects increas-
ing the failure risk or reject others more profitable considering bad information 
about the performance and the risk of their company. Oppositely, the managers take 
advantages of these manipulations when the firm profitability is low and their remu-
neration is based on stock-options. The increase on the firm value at a shirt-term im-
proves their remuneration even if it affects negatively the firm value at a long-term.
H6 : The remuneration by stock-options serves to align  
the interests of the mangers on those of the shareholders.
The debt is considered in the financial literature as an external mechanism being able 
to dissuade the managers to make decisions maximizing the firm value (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986; Denis and Denis, 1995). It contributes to reduce the 
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free cash-flows problem (Jensen, 1986) since the managers are asked to pay their en-
gagement towards their bank which limits their discretionary power (Stulz, 1990). In 
fact, the creditors accept to finance only profitable projects to guarantee the refunding 
of their debt. They refuse, consequently, to finance specific investments since their 
value decreases in case of financial distress (Nekhili and Poincelot, 2000). The debt 
incites, therefore, the managers to invest in more profitable projects in order to avoid 
the disciplinary effect of the external market.
However, the managers can use their investment policy to influence the capacity of 
the creditors to evaluate the profitability and the risk of their projects. They invest 
in R&D in diversified subsidiaries in order to increase informational asymmetry. 
In such situation, the creditors encounter serious difficulties to obtain necessary 
information to evaluate the profitability and risk of the investment and to control 
the managers.
H 7: The debt exerts a significant disciplinary effect on the managers
Methodology and results
Sample
Our sample includes 128 French firms with dimensions to index SBF 250. Since 
they present an atypical financial operation or that their economic operation is dif-
ficult to conceive in the reason of insufficiency of available data, certain companies 
such as banks, the insurance companies… are withdrawn from the initial sample.
Firms are classified in multinationals and domestics. To distinguish between them, 
we refer to two criteria used in Doukas and Pantzalis (2003). A firm is defined as 
multinational when this firm reports foreign assets and foreign sales ratios of 10% or 
more. On the other hand, the firm is defined as domestic firm only if it reports any 
foreign assets and foreign sales. Using this classification rule, two groups of compa-
nies are identified: the first includes 56 domestic firms and the second includes 72 
multinational firms.
R&D Investment, Governance and Management Entrenchment in French Companies Listed in SBF250
17Volume 1        Number 2        July 2011
The financial and managerial data are collected using annual reports. Collected data 
covers the 2003-2009 period. Our final sample consists of 128 groups over a period 
of 7 years (896 observations). The use of the panel data give the advantage to benefit 
from the both, individual and temporal dimension of the available information.
Model 
The aim of this section is to present the relation between the management entrench-
ment, the investment strategies and the governance. The model giving these rela-
tionships is shown below:
50 1 2 3 4
76 8 9
10 11 12
&it it it it it it
it it it it
it it it it
ENTR R D DEC CF ICM NADM
EXTAD SEPARAT INSTIT STOKOP
DEBT SIZE INT
α α α α α α
α α α α
α α α ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
with 
ENTRit : the management entrenchment measured by both the discretionary accru-
als and the seniority of the managers of the firm i in the year t,
NADMit: size of the board of directors of the firm i in the year t measured by the 
number of administrators,
EXTADit: Independence of the board of directors measured by the number of exter-
nal administrators divided by the number of all the administrators,
SEPARATit: Boolean variable having the value 1 if there is separation of the function 
of chief executive officer and chairman of the board of directors of the firm i in the 
year t, and 0 otherwise,
INSTITit: Boolean variable having the value 1 if there is presence of institutional 
investors holding more than 5% of assets of the firm i in the year t, and 0 otherwise,
STOKOPit: Boolean variable having the value 1 if firm i use the stock-option as 
incentive compensation in the year t, and 0 otherwise,
DEBTit: the debt used by the firm i in the year t measured by the financial debt 
divide by the total liabilities,
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R&Dit: the R&D expenditures divided by the total net sales,
DECit: Boolean variable having the value 1 if there is R&D decentralization in the 
firm i in the year t, and 0 otherwise,
CF it: The current cash-flows are used as a indicator of the capacity of the firm to 
generate future cash-flows. The selected cash-flows correspond to the result before 
depreciation, expenses and taxes,
ICMit : internal capital market measured by the volume of transactions between 
headquarters and their subsidiaries or between subsidiaries themselves,
INTit : Boolean variable having the value 1 if the firm i is a multinational company, 
and 0 otherwise,
SIZEit : the firm size measured by the logarithm of total assets,
εit : the error term.
Results and discussion
The estimation of multiple regression models requires the absence of multicolinear-
ity between the independent variables. This problem refers to a situation in which 
two or more explanatory variables are highly correlated. A problem of bi-variable 
multicolinearity arises when two independent variables are strongly correlated. 
Kervin (1992) estimates that a serious problem of multicolinearity arises starting 
from a limit of 0,7. Table 1 presents the Pearson correlation between exogenous 
variables appearing in our model.
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Table 1: Pearson correlation between independent variables
size Dec Mic Debt int cf stkopt instit R&D naDM extaD sepaRat
size 1.00
Dec 0.35 1.00
Mic -0.10 0.12 1.00
Debt 0.20 -0.15 0.00 1.00
int -0.40 -0.67 -0.04 0.18 1.00
cf -0.13 0.16 0.21 -0.28 -0.14 1.00
stkopt 0.15 0.14 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 1.00
instit 0.21 0.44 0.06 -0.06 -0.36 0.10 0.01 1.00
R&D -0.01 0.34 0.17 -0.10 -0.17 0.36 0.08 0.25 1.00
naDM 0.02 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.09 1.00
extaD 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.07 1.00
sepaRat -0.00 0.04 -0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.08 1.00
Results in table 1 indicate that all correlation coefficients are lower than 0,7. Conse-
quently, we conclude the absence of bi-variable multi-colinearity.
In addition, the sample combines both individual and time series data. This seems 
generate a risk of homogeneity on the sample which leads to bad estimators using 
the MCO regression. This requires some tests to identify if there is a presence of 
individual effects in the data and to specify in such case whether it is a fixed or a 
random effect. Two tests are used. The first is the test of presence of individual ef-
fect. The result is an “F-Statistic”. There is individual effect if the “p-value” is lower 
than the significance level (here: 10%). The second is the “Hausman” test. This later 
specifies the type of effect. The result is a “Chi-2” statistic which indicates that there 
is a random effect if the “p-value” is higher than 10% and a fixed effect otherwise.
The results of the two tests are presented in table 2.
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Table 2: Homogeneity and Hausman tests
Models
Homogeneity Hausman test Estimation 
Methodf(127, 752) prob > f chi2(12) prob>chi2
Model 1: accruals 5.90 0.0000  18.23 0.1090 GLs
Model 2: seniority of the manager 5.78 0.0000 19.72 0.0727 Within
Results in table 2 indicate that all «p-value» of the statistics “F” are lower than 10%. 
Thus, we reject the hypothesis of homogeneity of the data. Moreover the Hausman 
test indicates for the first model (Accruals) the effectiveness of the random effect 
estimator. However, the estimator gives bad results if there is a strongly correlation 
between the errors and the explanatory variables. For this reason, it would be better 
to use the GLS estimator.
Oppositely, the results of the “Hausman” test indicates for the second model (se-
niority of the manager) the effectiveness of the within operator.
Table 3 presents the results of the multi-variable estimate regression for entrench-
ment measured by both the accruals and the seniority of the managers.
Table 3: Multi-variable estimation regression result
Variables 
endogenous accruals (GLs) seniority of the manager (WitHin)
Variables exogenous coef. . z-statistic coef. . z-statistic
R&D 0.1689 1.75** 0.2415 2.29** 
Dec 0.1091 6.33*** 0.0455 2.53** 
cf 0.6690 31.15*** 0.6526 26.82*** 
icM 0.0725 4.40*** 0.0424 2.09** 
naDM -0.0008 -0.54 0.0008 0.57 
extaD 0.0035 0.13 -0.0340 -1.20 
sepaRat -0.0189 -1.62 -0.0016 -0.13 
institUt -0.4872 -7.23*** -0.4945 -5.63*** 
stockopt -0.2170 -2.45** -0.4224 -5.68*** 
Debt -0.0108 -0.71 0.0038 0.24 
int -0.0008 -0.07 0.0313 2.45** 
size -0.0369 -10.99*** -0.0408 -9.64*** 
_cons 0.7440 14.12*** 0.8160 13.18*** 
Wald chi2(12) 1499.46 R-sq: within 0.5922 
prob > chi2 0.0000 f(12,806) 97.55
Log likelihood 316.5322 prob > f 0.0000
number of obs 892 number of obs 892
number of groups 128 number of groups 128
obs per group:
min = 6
avg = 6.97
max = 7
obs per group:
min = 6
avg = 6.95
max = 7
Significant at the level:: (***) 1% ; (**) 5% and (*) 10%.
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Results in table 3 indicate a positive influence of the R&D on the management en-
trenchment. The specific investment helps managers to improve their own returns 
at the expense of the shareholders and to maintain their position at long-term. They 
invest in R&D to escape from the control through the increase of informational asym-
metry. The specificity of these investments is that they are in dependency to the man-
agers’ private knowledge and competence. They influence, consequently, their pres-
ence in the firm at the long-term. In addition, managers may profit from the increase 
on R&D associate to this investment to influence the effectiveness of the control they 
supported by limiting the capacity of the controllers to specific information. This gives 
them more authority towards the shareholders and the other stakeholders.
The financial intermediaries have generally different means to dissuade the manag-
ers. They have easy access to private information which offers them more authority 
towards the manager. Consequently, they exert an effective control. However, the 
managers influence the quality of the control using their investment strategy. They 
increase their investment in R&D to avoid the debt finance since creditors refuse 
to finance specific investment. In fact, there are intangible assets which can’t serve 
as guarantee in case of financial distress. They, also, increase the firm risk and help 
managers to transfer incomes from creditors to shareholders. Managers profit from 
this situation of less debt finance to serve their own interests at the expense of the 
shareholders. Giving that they are less controlled they increase their private expen-
ditures in specific assets allowing them to be in the firm at a long-term.
These results seem to confirm the prediction of Nekhili and Poincelot (2000) con-
sidering that the R&D, as risky and intangible investments, cannot be easily fi-
nanced by debts. 
Taken together these arguments allow us to confirm our first hypothesis according 
to which the R&D reinforces the management entrenchment.
Given that the R&D considered separately influences positively the management 
entrenchment, his decentralization reinforces the opportunist behavior since it gen-
erates several problem of informational asymmetry. Results in table 3, indicate a 
positive and significant impact of the decentralization of the R&D on both the 
accruals and the seniority of the managers. Managers decentralize their specific in-
vestment to decrease the effectiveness of the control. They increase the difficulty to 
access to private information serving to a good control because the external environ-
ment constitutes a major resource of uncertainty.
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Thus, innovation and decentralization constitute essential factors encouraging the 
emergence of the favorable conditions for the management entrenchment. Indeed, 
diversification increases organizational complexity which affects negatively the qual-
ity of available information. This indicates that innovation and diversification help 
manager to maximize their own interests at the expense of the development of the 
firm. They increase, particularly, the informational opacity which enhance the au-
thority of the managers towards the shareholders and others controllers.
Particularly, decentralization leads to more uncertainty by increasing the cultural 
and linguistics distance between the actors. Environmental uncertainty influences 
the control system and helps managers to make decisions serving their entrench-
ment.
These arguments seem to confirm our hypothesis H1b according to which the decen-
tralization of R&D reinforces the management entrenchment.
We notice, in addition, a positive influence of the internal finance on both the 
accruals and the seniority of the managers. This seems to confirm our second hy-
pothesis and the predictions of the theory of free cash-flows developed by Jensen 
(1986). That is to say that managers use the excess of internal resources to finance 
specific investment serving their own interests at the expense of the shareholders. 
They invest in intangible assets even they are non profitable in order to increase 
their discretionary behavior. The R&D generates serious problems of informational 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers and helps these later to entrench 
largely in the firm. The dependence of these investments on the managers’ knowl-
edge and competences helps them to be maintained in their station at a long-term 
and/or to maximize their private expenditure. 
Internal finance is used by managers to avoid the disciplinary effect of the debt. This 
indicates a positive relationship between the internal resources and the management 
entrenchment. The excess in cash-flows helps managers to finance specific invest-
ment generally constrained on the external market. This helps them to increase 
informational asymmetry by investing in specific assets and to avoid the control of 
external market.
We also note that the presence of the ICM reinforces the opportunistic behavior of 
the managers. It presents a positive impact on management entrenchment. In fact, 
the managers substitute their internal market to the external market in order to 
avoid the control exerted by this later. Secondly, the flexibility of transaction within 
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the ICM helps them to transfer the excess of financial resources from subsidiaries 
with less investment in R&D to those with high investment in order to enhance 
their opportunistic behavior. In other words, the internal finance of the risky invest-
ment by ICM allows the managers to improve enhance their gain at the expense 
of the shareholders. This result seems to be in contradiction with the prediction of 
Williamson (1975) according to which the IMC serves to finance the well profitable 
projects and to exert a significant control on the managers.
Taken together, these arguments allow us to confirm the third hypothesis according 
to which the managers prefer the ICM to the external market in order to increase 
their discretionary behavior by investing in specific investment and eliminating the 
control of the debt.
We note, Moreover, a negative relationship between the management entrenchment 
and the presence of institutional investors. These later, exert by comparison to their 
individual competitors, more effective control on the managers. They have necessary 
skills allowing them a better evaluation ex ante of risk and return associated to new 
investments and to ensure an effective control ex post on the managers.
In fact, given the importance of assets they hold, the institutional investors are 
incited to invest in the control of the manager instead of liquidating their portfo-
lio of assets because the sale of the blocks of stocks affects negatively their value. 
The high assets they hold give them, also, more authority towards the managers. 
These later have to manage the firm so as to improve its performance in order to 
avoid the possibility of massive sale of assets held by the institutional investors. 
In fact, the massive sale of assets decreases the stock price and affects negatively 
the firm performance what reduces, significantly, the managers’ gain particularly 
if their compensation is based on the performance. This confirms our hypothesis 
H 5 according to which the presence of institutional investors exerts an effective 
control on the managers.
We note, in addition, a negative relation between the management entrenchment 
and the incentive compensation. This result is in accordance with our sixth hy-
pothesis. The stock-option as incentive compensation serves to align the interest 
of the managers on that of their principal (shareholders). It decreases the agency 
conflict between shareholders and managers and incites the later to manage the 
firm to improve the performance. These results confirm the predictions of Caby 
and Hirigoyen (2005), Core and Guay (2001), Hartzell and Starks (2003) and 
Palia (2001). Incentive compensation constitutes, in fact, a very significant tool 
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serving to resolve the agency conflicts by punishing the deviating behavior of the 
managers.
The shareholders are the first victims of the discretionary behaviors of the managers. 
Since they have not necessary skills to control the managers, the shareholders choose 
to align their compensation to the performance. In fact, the stock-options incite the 
managers to invest in more profitable and less risky project what improve the firm 
performance and consequently their own gain since their compensation is indexed 
on the performance.
Results in table 3 indicate, oppositely, a non-significant relationship between the 
debt and the management entrenchment measured by both the discretionary accru-
als and the seniority of the managers. The creditors have, naturally, several means to 
discipline the managers. They have an easier access to private information enabling 
them to better control the manager. 
Moreover, the obligation of refunding of the debt and the interests is supposed to re-
duce the manager autonomy compared to the shareholders. In particular, the creditors 
agree to finance only profitable projects to guarantee the refunding of their debt at 
the date of payment. They require fixed assets as guarantees and refuse to finance the 
R&D investments since they are in major part intangible. Their net value asset (NVA) 
is very weak even null in the event of discontinuity of the business. Consequently, the 
creditors incur high risk when they finance these investments. Moreover, the increase 
in the expenditure in R&D helps the manager to increase the risk of the activity and 
to ensure a transfer of wealth from the creditors to the shareholders.
Thus, to avoid the debt and to neutralize its disciplinary effect, the managers try to 
increase their investments in R&D. They also decentralize these investments to in-
crease informational asymmetry and to incite the creditors to refuse the financing of 
their organizations. This strategy influences the effectiveness of the control exerted 
by the debt on the manager.
For these reasons, the debt constitutes only marginally part in the financing of the 
R&D. The decentralization of these investments reinforces informational asymme-
try and pushes the creditors to minimize the debt amounts. Taken together, these 
arguments seem to explain why the debt exerts a significant disciplinary effect on 
the managers.
We note, moreover, the absence of a significant relation between the management 
entrenchment and the characteristics of the board of directors. Several arguments 
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can be proposed to interpret this result. Firstly, the increase in the investments in 
R&D restricts the access of the administrators to information and gives the manag-
ers more authority vis-à-vis the shareholders. Secondly, the high number of admin-
istrators can generate conflicts and poses a problem of coordination and several dif-
ficulties to maintain good relations between the members, which affect the quality 
of the control exerted by the board of directors on the managers. This leads to reject 
the hypotheses H4a, H4b and H4c, according to which the characteristics of the board 
of directors (size, independence and separation of the functions of CEO and chair-
man) exert an effective control on the managers.
We also note a positive relationship between the multinational character of the firm 
and the management entrenchment as measured by the seniority of the managers. 
However, the impact of the multinational character on the accruals is non-signifi-
cant. The leaders diversify their investment to benefit from uncertainties character-
izing the external environment of their organization. The investments which they 
maintain abroad are difficult to control because of the cultural differences and the 
linguistic difficulties that may face the controllers. Moreover, the costs of transfer of 
knowledge increase the difficulty to access to information about foreign activities. 
This seems to reinforce the capacity of the managers with respect to these actors and 
to increase their discretionary behavior.
Conclusion
This study examines the effectiveness of the control system imposed on the manag-
ers by confronting the assumptions of the theories of the agency, the incentives, and 
the management entrenchment. The effectiveness of the control systems seems to 
be influenced by the deviating behavior of the managers. Their statute offers them 
the capacity to make decisions affecting the shareholders wealth and the effective-
ness of the control exerted by these later. The innovation and the (geographically) 
diversification help them to influence the quality of the control exerted by the board 
of directors and the financial intermediaries. The investment of the additional re-
sources in R&D in geographically diversified units increases the investment risks 
and the informational asymmetry toward the partners of the company. It increases, 
consequently, the discretionary of the manager at the expense of the shareholders 
and prepares to a favorable ground to their opportunistic behavior.
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However, the institutional investors have necessary competences to exert a more 
effective control on the managers. The diversity of the investments they carry out 
helps them to evaluate more efficiency the position and to ensure a more effective 
control.
The alignment of the compensation to the performance may solve the agency prob-
lems between shareholders and managers. It incites the later to make decisions 
which do not affect the shareholders wealth and which create more value.
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